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Which are the factors that favor societal radicalization? Few studies in international and national radicalization
research have been directly interested in investigating the societal level and discussing the impact of radicalized
groups, milieus and strata on society and its potential radicalization. This article provides on overview of current
research and discusses factors favoring the radicalization of societies. The latter arises when the legitimacy of
the political system is called into question and a society witnesses a departure from prevailing social norms in
political dealings, especially if the use of political violence is no longer rejected. All in all, radicalized individuals,
groups, milieus or strata can hold the potential for radicalizing societies. Increasing and incremental socio-polit-
ical changes can lead to decreasing social cohesion. In view of this possibility, the authors call for strengthening
social resilience and civilizing the public debate.
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To some, developments such as the challenges to free-
dom of the press in Hungary or the independence of
the judiciary in Poland, Brexit, the heated rhetoric in
US-American political discourse or violent demonstra-
tions such as those by right-wing extremists in Char-
lottesville, USA, or Chemnitz, Germany, are a sign of
the accelerating transformation of European societies.
Some  observers  associate  these  developments  with
the concept of radicalization and speak of “radicalized
societ[ies]” (see Maaßen 2016; Lantemann 2016). 
Taking up this train of thought, the present article
assesses  current  societal  developments  through  the
lens of the radicalization concept. In using the term
radicalization, however, we are not attempting to be
alarmist  (Backes  2013)  nor  affirm the  claims  of  al-
ready radicalized societies cited above. Rather, by de-
scribing current dynamics and factors that are consid-
ered to foster the radicalization of society, we aim to
advance the various attempts that have been made to
conceptualize mass or macro-level radicalization. 
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At the same time, we do not deny that processes of
radicalization – whether politically or religiously mo-
tivated  –  are  posing  major  challenges  to  societies.
When (ever) more people begin casting doubt on the
legitimacy  of  the  dominant  order,  increasingly  turn
their backs on prevailing norms, and/or when mem-
bers of society use anti-democratic means, especially
violence, to advance their objectives, democratic and
open societies will find themselves under threat (see
Abay Gaspar et al. 2020). This is what we understand
as radicalization: a process through which beliefs and
behavior change in directions that increasingly justify
violence (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 416).
Yet, when considering radicalization at the level of
society, the question of beliefs and behavior assumes
a different  angle.  While  the field  of  “radicalization-
studies” appears to have been surging in recent years,
a number of scholars have expressed their dissatisfac-
tion with the term.  Authors  such as  Horgan (2008),
Bjørgo (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009) and Borum (2011a)
question the notion as being primarily about cognitive
and ideological processes. They, and others,  criticize
the concept further on account of
its excessive focus on the individual level of analysis and
its tendency to de-contextualize the phenomenon, and
[we are] calling for greater attention to be given to the
meso-level  of  radical  movements  and milieus  and the
role  of  the  wider  societal  and  political  environment
(Malthaner 2017: 370).1
Though many studies acknowledge the role of cer-
tain social and spatial environments, these have not
been very well conceptualized due to the methodolog-
ical focus on individuals or groups. At the same time,
within the steadily growing body of interdisciplinary
research on radicalization, many scholars agree that
radicalization can occur at different levels, i.e. that en-
tire  societies  have  the  potential  to  radicalize  (Mc-
Cauley and Moskalenko 2008: 417). In such processes
of societal or “mass radicalization”, as McCauley and
Moskalenko called it (2008; 2011), not every member
of a  society  will  radicalize;  instead, individuals  may
develop a growing affinity for repressive, anti-pluralist
and  discriminatory  values,  structures  and  actions,
which, above all else, can jeopardize the viability of an
open society.  Accordingly,  when thinking  about the
radicalization of society,  we ask how the radicaliza-
1 See also Horgan 2008; Kundnani 2012: 5; Schmid 2013: 3-4.
tion of individuals and groups can affect society as a
whole and potentially lead to mass radicalization.
With this in mind, we offer an outline for how the
“radicalization of society” can be conceptualized. This
outline draws from a review of current research, from
political  and religious  processes  of  radicalization  as
well as from conceptualizations of mass radicalization.
We then expand our focus to literature beyond radi-
calization research in order to identify factors and dy-
namics that are deemed to enable the radicalization
of society. We conclude by identifying, inter alia, po-
larization as an important factor and provide possible
options for action. Our main contribution here is to
offer a conceptualization of the “radicalization of soci-
ety” by identifying and analyzing factors conducive to
this process. We have therefore not included factors
that are detrimental to such a development. While we
are addressing the question of radicalization of soci-
ety from a general perspective, in order to avoid being
too abstract, we highlight how specific processes play
out in individual societies by providing a specific fo-
cus on Germany to illustrate just what is at stake. We
would like to note that our review is by no means ex-
haustive  in  covering  all  literature  on  radicalization.
Given the ever-growing size of the field, this would be
way beyond the scope of our article.2
1 Conceptualizing the “radicalization of society”
Nailing down an object of study as broad and multi-
faceted as “society” obviously makes the task of con-
ceptualizing a process like the radicalization of society
difficult. Methodologically speaking, there are differ-
ent ways to proceed. By asking how the radicalization
of individuals and groups affects society as a whole
and potentially leads to mass radicalization, we took a
bottom-up approach. In light of the difficulty of con-
ceptualizing  the  radicalization  of  society,  this  ap-
proach offers the advantage of incorporating empiri-
cally  driven  literature  about  radicalization.  We first
take  a  closer look at  research on different  types  of
radicalization (such as right- or left-wing extremism)
in the context  of  liberal  democracies,  providing our
conceptualization with some empirical grounding and
highlighting the diversity of the process of radicaliza-
tion. Moreover, proceeding in a bottom-up fashion al-
2 For overviews cf. Borum (2011b; 2011c), Schmid (2013).
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lows us to uncover the areas in which additional fac-
tors – not generated at the individual or group level –
need to be addressed as well  as identify the factors
and  elements  in  the  process  of  mass  radicalization
that can specifically be attributed to the societal level.
As mentioned above, it is highly likely that polariza-
tion is conducive to mass radicalization.
Using a set of keywords (e.g. “radicalization of soci-
ety” and “mass radicalization”), we conducted a sys-
tematic review of current literature in relevant scien-
tific databases.3 In the period from 2000 to 2019, we
identified 103 works  that  deal  with the question of
radicalization of society in different ways. The major-
ity of these were empirical or theoretical models or ty-
pologies aiming to uncover different steps within radi-
calization  processes,  followed  by  a  second  group
grounded on theoretical models that explain radical-
ization processes in general.
2 Political and religious processes of radicalization
As we emphasized above,  radicalization is a process
within which beliefs,  feelings and behaviors become
successively extreme. This ideological-behavioral dis-
tinction is important to bear in mind when asking the
question of how the radicalization of individuals and
groups affects society as a whole and potentially leads
to mass radicalization. 
In  liberal  democracies,  radicalization  is  a  process
through which  social  concepts  at  odds  with  liberal
democracy  become  hegemonic.  Within  the  political
debate,  such positions  have  been  designated  as  ex-
tremist, though the term extremism is, in itself, prob-
lematic. Semantically, at least, the term implies that a
political center exists as a protected space,  one sur-
rounded  by  left-wing  and  right-wing  extremes  that
distance themselves from it in somewhat equal mea-
sure.  However,  empirical  findings  from  the  case  of
Germany (see below) have demonstrated that certain
parts of this middle ground are prone to adopting ex-
treme-right positions. Moreover, it has proven difficult
to define left-wing extremists at all.  The term “left-
wing extremism” is heavily contested, as it runs the
risk  of  conflating  the  views  of  left-wing  extremists
with those of the democratic left (Teune 2018). These
3 Google Scholar, Web of Science, Pollux and WISO (one of 
the largest German-language compilations of literature ref-
erences and full texts on economics and social sciences).
considerations illustrate just how inadequate the term
extremism is. Yet, as existing literature primarily relies
on this term, we have chosen to keep it and offer dif-
ferentiated viewpoints any time we deem the term to
be obviously lacking.
2.1 Islamism and left-wing extremism
Few studies have been conducted addressing the radi-
calizing effects that far-left extremist or Islamist indi-
viduals, groups, milieus and layers can have on a soci-
ety.  To start with,  Kundnani (2012:  22) refers to the
idea  that  radicalization  arises  via  interactions  be-
tween the state and the individual/group. He recom-
mends including a critical viewpoint on anti-terrorism
and anti-violence measures, primarily carried out by
Western states, within a macro-level analysis. A study
by O’Duffy (2008) also shows that views young Mus-
lims hold about Britain’s foreign policies are closely
related to social, economic and cultural sources of dis-
satisfaction. As Ranstorp (2016: 4) argues, polarization
is a “push factor” for radicalization. Drawing on the
example of French and German efforts to combat ter-
rorism since September 11,  2001,  Mucha (2017:  231)
identifies  a  causal  connection  between  polarization
and  radicalization,  asserting  that  “polarization  and
stigmatization  breed  radicalization”.  Here,  polariza-
tion is conceptualized as a factor that is conducive to
radicalization.
Research on the role of deprivation,  disintegration
and socio-economic factors provides insights into the
inner workings  of  societies in relation to radicaliza-
tion.  The explanatory power of  social  disintegration
and deprivation (due to poverty, injustice, exploitation
and a lack of education) as a source of radicalization
remains  contested  (Goli  and  Rezaei  2012;  Maurer
2017).  Research  addressing  the  level  of  society  in-
cludes  theoretically  informed  empirical  studies  (cf.
Malthaner and Waldmann 2014) that utilize the con-
cept of milieus to create a bridge between groups and
society. However, meritorious attempts such as these
have been few and far between.
A similar picture arises with regard to left-wing ex-
tremism (Pfahl-Traughber  2014,  2017;  Bergsdorf  and
van  Hüllen  2011;  Deutz-Schroeder  and  Schroeder
2016; Schroeder and Deutz-Schroeder 2015), with ex-
isting literature seriously struggling with the concep-
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tualization of left-wing extremism. Can the use of vio-
lence be taken as the differentiating factor? Or is it
the rejection of democracy and the existence of ideo-
logical differences within the left-wing spectrum? In
the context of Germany, for example, existing studies
work with the concept of “societal (or social) left-wing
extremism” (Pfahl-Traughber 2014: 11), which is said
to be a sounding board for the actions of left-wing ex-
tremist  groups.  This  concept  underlines  the  accep-
tance  of  the  corresponding  mentalities  among  the
population,  holding the potential  for  mobilizing the
population. Yet, this is by no means limited to Ger-
many.  South-Western-Europe  (Spain,  Italy  and
Greece), in particular, have seen a rise of left-wing ex-
tremism in its variant of anarchist extremisms (focus-
ing on violent  anti-capitalist  acts).  For many, socio-
economic instability combined with a rise in immigra-
tion,  jihadi  terrorism and reactions  from right-wing
extremist groups has led to an increase in anarchist
extremism  (Koch  2018).  While  this  bespeaks  what
Eatwell called “cumulative extremism” (i.e., when one
form  of  political  extremism  mobilizes  against  an-
other), this assessment does not directly address how
individual and group radicalization may effect society.
That being said, it is also clear that ongoing and ex-
panding cumulative extremism is likely to have some
societal effect.
At the same time, we are at a lack for studies that
can serve as a basis for analyzing the acceptance of
left-wing  extremist  views  within  society  (Pfahl-
Traughber 2014:  1).  While studies by Schroeder and
Deutz-Schroeder  (2015;  2016)  have  attempted  to  fill
this gap, the reach of their findings is restricted by the
difficulty  of  incorporating  the  vast  diversity  of  the
left-wing spectrum into a single denominator.
This mere handful of studies claim that radicalized
views from the left side of the political spectrum do,
indeed, find resonance among the population,  espe-
cially  within  the  political  and social  discourse  (e.g.,
large segments of the population also take a position
against racism). However, these results must be con-
sidered  in  relation  to  problems  associated  with  the
definition  of  the  concept  itself.  Consequently,  com-
pared  to  studies  about  the  “center”,  scholarship  on
“left-wing extremism” and “Islamism” include few, if
any, studies that analyze the overall societal relevance
of extremist views and their potential for radicalizing
society.
2.2 Right-wing extremism
Globally, the research community in Germany boasts
the longest tradition of research about right-wing ex-
tremism,  with  the  greatest  number  of  studies  that
have made use of a macro-analytical approach. In the
German academic context, a so-called “consensus def-
inition” (Decker et al. 2013; Kreis 2007: 5) has estab-
lished itself, defining right-wing extremist views as a
radicalized ideology of inequality. This can manifest
itself  in six areas:  support for dictators,  chauvinism,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Social Darwinism and the
trivialization of National Socialism. Based on this, a
questionnaire  was  developed  for  measuring  right-
wing extremist views (Decker et al. 2013).4 A research
group  headed  by  Oliver  Decker  and  Elmar  Brähler
makes use of this questionnaire every two years (the
Leipzig  “Mitte”  Studies)  to  measure  the  spread  of
right-wing  extremism  in  Germany.  Drawing  from
Critical  Theory,  they  work  with  the  underlying  as-
sumption of secondary authoritarianism acting at the
level of society, emerging in the form of authoritarian
aggression at the level of the individual (Decker 2015).
The key element of this assumption is that identifica-
tion with power and strength does not, in fact, have
to do with authority  (a  “Führer”)  but  rather  with a
“strong economy”. This element does, however, func-
tion in a comparable manner: like a Führer, it may de-
mand submission;  and though it  compensates some
forms of subjugation through an identification with a
powerful economy, certain release valves must also be
provided, such the devaluation of others.
A related concept is the syndrome of “group-related
misanthropy”.  This  concept  was  introduced  by  re-
searchers in Bielefeld, Germany, to provide an expla-
nation  for  the  occurrence  of  right-wing  extremist
views on the basis of socio-cognitive social  psychol-
ogy. This syndrome is also taken to be a “core element
of right-wing extremist views” (Küpper and Zick 2015)
and it  is  based on the fundamental  ideology of  in-
equality.  A  longitudinal  study  (2002-2012)  demon-
strated that variations of group-related misanthropy
4 The consensus definition does not incorporate the aspect 
of violence, and, as such, it can only make statements about 
the views held by right-wing extremists.
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are  widespread  among German society  and around
“80 percent of respondents signalized at least one ele-
ment of agreement” (Küpper and Zick 2015).
Numerous  authors  have  emphasized  the  signifi-
cance of  the level  of  society considering that  many
currents of right-wing extremism are governed by his-
torical and social  transformations,  embedded within
an overarching societal framework (see Butterwegge
2006;  Decker,  Kiess,  and  Brähler  2013). Studies  by
Heitmeyer (1992, 2002) investigating the effects that
social modernization and increasing individualization
have on processes  of  social  disintegration provide a
case in point.  A similar path is  taken, albeit  a con-
tested one, by studies that identify relative depriva-
tion and/or socio-economic disadvantages as catalysts
of  right-wing  extremist  radicalization  (Stöss  2007;
Steininger and Rotte 2009). Butterwegge places partic-
ular emphasis on the significance of society, arguing
that right-wing extremism is “not to be removed from
the respective  social  conditions”  (Butterwegge 2006:
16).  As  opposed  to  many  other  authors,  he  deems
right-wing extremism to be a problem that arises out
of macro-societal processes.
In  the  research  series  about  group-related  misan-
thropy  titled  “German  Conditions”  (Deutsche
Zustände 2002-2011), studies by Leipzig-based authors
led by Oliver Decker (since 2002, last study from 2016)
and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2006-2012, in co-
operation with the Leipzig team, and, since 2014, with
a team headed by Andreas Zick from Bielefeld) inves-
tigated whether populist  and/or extremist views are
represented at the center of society. The assumption
here is that the “‘center’ [is] not the protective realm
of democracy” (Decker, Kiess, and Brähler 2016: 15);
rather,  it  contains  a  “reservoir  of  hostile  and right-
wing populist ideologies, from which right-wing pop-
ulist as well as right-wing extremist milieus can draw”
(Zick and Küpper 2015). In this context, “center” refers
to the center of the political-ideological spectrum. The
reasons for this are complex and anything but mono-
causal. Adherents of group-related misanthropy syn-
drome identify the syndrome as a “hinge” that con-
nects extremist views with the center of society. The
danger  lurking  below the  surface  of  this  syndrome,
according to this argument, lies in the connection be-
tween  right-wing  extremism  and  alleged  normality.
Group-related misanthropy “prescribes  normality,  in
that it claims that inequality is normal” (Zick et al.
2016: 81). At the same time, the authors of the Leipzig
study series describe the societal center as itself being
fragile, drawing from the concept of the authoritarian
character and from Lipset’s concept of the extremism
of  the  center  mentioned  above  (Decker,  Kiess,  and
Brähler 2016). A perceived threat along with a sense
of political powerlessness and an inclination towards
authoritarianism all appear to play a significant role
(Decker 2015; Küpper and Zick 2015).
A more recent study in this context (Decker, Kiess,
and Brähler 2016) has investigated the contemporary
state  of  affairs  within  German  society  over  an  ex-
tended period of time. Using socio-demographic indi-
cators and quantitative methods, this research com-
pares the political  views held by various population
groups representative of the overall German populace.
In order to determine the groups within the popula-
tion, the authors use data from the Leipzig studies on
the  socio-political  center  from  the  years  2006  and
2016.  The  comparison  reveals  two  different  results:
first, they indicate a strengthening of the ideological
center, which can be seen as a positive development.
At the same time, the study identifies signs of polar-
ization and radicalization over a period of ten years,
demonstrating that some segments of German society
clearly harbor right-wing extremist views, giving rise
to processes of polarization in confrontation with be-
lievers in democracy and anti-democrats. The estab-
lishment  of  independent  defense  leagues  (such  as
“Gruppe Freital” in Germany or the “English Defence
League” in the UK) or individual acts are telling of the
consequences  that  can arise from this form of  con-
frontational polarization.
We should emphasize that this comparative consid-
eration of various types of extremism should not be
taken as an attempt to portray them as equal. In each
national  context,  research  has  focused  on  different
types of extremism, accordingly the state of affairs is
different. A consideration of these three types of ex-
tremism does, at least, show that processes of political
polarization nurtured by extremist  positions  are,  in-
deed,  able  to  advance  societal  radicalization.  Such
comparisons are, however, always subject to the cy-
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cles of public attention related to the contemporary
relevance granted to varying extremisms.
3 Conceptual reflections on the process of a 
radicalization of society
Moving away from these empirical findings, concep-
tual  literature  on  radicalization  has  shown  us  that
past research has primarily considered the individual
and group levels  when discussing the role  of  social
structures within the context of individual and group-
specific processes of radicalization (Kjøk et al.  2003;
Midlarsky 2011; Hegghammer 2013). Few studies fo-
cusing on the societal level investigate the effects on
society  originating  from  radicalized  individuals  and
groups (Malthaner 2017: 388).
As mentioned above, we are unable to provide an ex-
haustive overview of recent literature and instead fo-
cus on the bodies of literature that came up in our
database searches (see p.  3). Three branches are par-
ticularly interesting in this context. First, one crucial
insight  from  social  movement  literature  (cf.  della
Porta  and Tarrow 1986;  della  Porta  1995)  shows  us
that radicalization is embedded in a social and politi-
cal context as well as broader processes of contention.
Second, this insight is in line with studies on political
violence:  both  branches  analytically  embed  radical
movements and violent  groups within a field popu-
lated by different actors involved in the conflict. In his
seminal work, Tilly (1978) illustrated how processes of
modernization  and nation-building  changed the  ac-
tions adopted by movements as these developments
provided for new targets and new opportunity struc-
tures (cf. also Traugott 1995). In recent times, we must
add globalization and the Internet as crucial external
influences on radical movements and groups (Winter
et al.  2020, in this  focus section).  In both fields, au-
thors  are  attentive  to  the  “social  environments  and
spatial settings, such as micromobilization settings in
the form of countercultural milieus, radical milieus, or
radical  networks  emerging  at  the  fringes  of  social
movements  as  well  as  movement  safe  spaces”
(Malthaner  2017:  376;  cf.  also  della  Porta  1995;
Malthaner 2014; Cross and Snow 2011; Malthaner and
Waldmann 2014). 
Third,  the  studies  by  McCauley  and  Moskalenko
(2008; 2011) are highly instructive, with their consider-
ation of collective processes of radicalization and, par-
ticularly the concept of mass radicalization, being par-
ticularly telling. In their view, mass radicalization oc-
curs  in  conflict  with  other  states  or  other  political
groups (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 418). For in-
stance, “a state and its citizens are radicalized in the
run-up to interstate conflicts and war, and, as evident
in the U.S. after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in
state response to terrorism as  well”  (McCauley and
Moskalenko  2008:  416).  They  identify  three  mecha-
nisms that are relevant to mass radicalization: jujitsu
politics, hate and martyrdom. Jujitsu politics consists
of  “using  the  enemy’s  strength  against  him”  (Mc-
Cauley and Moskalenko 2008: 427), as external attacks
produce mass radicalization. Following an attack, calls
for cohesion are replaced by calls for nationalism, pa-
triotism,  etc.,  whereas  terrorist  sympathizers  might
now mobilize due to the reaction to the attack on the
part of the general public. Hate as mechanism of mass
radicalization comes into play when negative percep-
tions of conflict  parties become extreme, potentially
leading  to  the  dehumanization  of  the  other  group
(McCauley  and  Moskalenko  2008:  427).  Martyrdom
can have radicalizing effects as giving one’s life for a
cause exerts strong powers of persuasion, convincing
others of the rightfulness and trustfulness of a group’s
motives  and  ideology  (McCauley  and  Moskalenko
2008: 428).
For collective radicalization, one finding offered by
these different studies and their focus on processes of
contention, populated social environments, hate and
action-reaction mechanisms is the increase in hostile
encounters between different individuals and groups
within  a  society.  Mechanisms  of  group-polarization
and general dynamics of polarization loom large when
attempting to conceptualize societal or mass radical-
ization  (see  McCauley  and  Moskalenko  2011;  della
Porta and LaFree 2011; Schmid 2013: 18; Mucha 2017).
Eatwell’s concept of “cumulative extremism” encom-
passes such processes of polarization leading to radi-
calization,  with reference to “the way in which one
form of  extremism can  feed  off  and  magnify  other
forms” (Eatwell 2006: 205). 
Political  polarization  is  taken  to  be  a  “process  in
which a dichotomy (increasingly) emerges” (Schmidt
2010:  601),  though it  is  not  necessarily  a  matter  of
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only one type of dichotomy. Polarization exemplifies
the relations between civil society groups and minori-
ties as well as how they interact with one another. Po-
litically polarized relations among social  actors may
manifest though a largely hostile  or confrontational
approach. Tilly (2003) advances the argument that po-
larization is one of the mechanisms that explain the
form and incidence  of  collective  violence:  “Polariza-
tion generally promotes collective violence because it
makes  the  us-them boundary  more  salient,  hollows
out  the  uncommitted  middle,  intensifies  conflicts
across the boundary, raises the stakes of winning or
losing, and enhances opportunities for leaders to initi-
ate action against their enemies” (Tilly 2003: 21-22). 
International  literature  on  radicalization  assumes
that processes of radicalization are primarily reflected
in  the  polarizing  tendencies  of  public  opinion  (Mc-
Cauley and Moskalenko 2011:  259;  Schmid 2013:  4).
This may occur, for example, as happened in the con-
text of Germany when right-wing populist views on
“migration” polarized the center of society and made
use of derogatory, hostile portrayals of refugees. Such
views establish themselves as an antithesis to various
civil society groups that assist refugees and advocate
for  diversity  (Zick  and Küpper  2015:  10).  Moreover,
when  those  affected  draw  comparisons  to  refugee
groups or migrant communities, a perception of sub-
jective disadvantage can arise, with polarizing effects.
Generally speaking, such comparisons are not neces-
sarily motivated by objective factors of unfairness in
relation to other social groups. Social psychology re-
searchers, in contrast, use Social Identity Theory, Ter-
ror Management Theory and authoritarianism to dis-
cuss subjective needs (e.g., for recognition and status)
that function as motivators for making social compar-
isons  (Endrikat  et  al.  2002;  Greenberg,  Pyszczinski,
and Solomon 1986).
However, the professed democratic belief in plural-
ism and the right to express opposition does not in-
evitably  contradict  polarized  political  confrontation.
In representative democracies, “a certain degree of po-
larization between competing groups in their striving
to gain democratically legitimate power can be seen
as  a  constitutive  element  of  this  type  of  system”
(Helms 2017: 64). Polarization is not negative, per se,
but  democratic  cohesion  and  stability  depend  on
“how, despite all divergences and differences among
groups,  equality,  especially that of its social  minori-
ties, is protected and strengthened” (Zick 2016: 204).
In  addition,  stability  is  also  determined  by  democ-
racy’s defensive potential in the face of extreme orien-
tations seeking to contest or replace it.
We can conclude by saying that the radicalization of
individuals or groups may bring about the radicaliza-
tion  of  society  as  a  whole  (see  Decker  and Joppke
2018). The point at which society can be considered
radicalized is  ultimately a normative question; how-
ever, siding with Tilly’s argument on polarization be-
ing a catalyst for collective violence, we conclude that
polarized situations promote processes of radicaliza-
tion.
4 Radicalizing factors within society
In this section, we broaden our view and consider fac-
tors  in  the  context  of  socio-political  manifestations
such as populism and anti-Semitism, arguing that nu-
merous factors operating together, rather than single
factors alone, are what fosters the radicalization of a
society. Such factors are able to politically polarize so-
ciety to the extent that individuals or groups come to
stand in hostile opposition to a broad segment of the
populace, leading to ruptures within society and jeop-
ardizing social cohesion. These include the rise of pop-
ulism and populist parties, the public approach to mi-
gration and Islamophobia,  factors involved in re-na-
tionalization/ ethnicizing,  and changes in  the socio-
political  discourse.  Anti-Semitism  rounds  off  this
group and exhibits parallels across the three forms of
extremism depicted above.
4.1 Populism in the 21st century
The successful Brexit referendum and the victory of
Donald Trump in the 2016 United States presidential
elections marked a breakthrough for populism within
Western societies, which had gained a West European
visage through parties such as the Front National in
France and movements such as Pegida in Germany.
The potential for populism to radicalize society as a
whole was perhaps most vividly expressed in the “ele-
phant chart”  created by former World  Bank econo-
mist Milanovic (2012). In a single stroke, the chart vi-
sualized  the  social  significance  of  globalization,  its
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winners and losers, and highlighted the polarizing de-
velopments  taking  place  in  Western  societies.  The
chart shows the development of global income growth
from 1988 to 2008, with growth initially rising rapidly
from the lower to mid income brackets (indicating sig-
nificant income growth) followed by a sharp decline
in the upper brackets before rising once again in the
very top bracket – the upper “trunk” of the elephant.
Three key messages can be taken from this.  First,
the poorest 5% of the world’s population (around one
billion people) are just as poor as they were before the
onset  of  globalization;  these  are  the  individuals  ex-
cluded from globalization, especially in Africa. Second,
even more than the new middles classes in China and
India,  the  actual  winners  of  globalization  are  the
wealthiest one percent of the population, which still
accounts for some 60 million people. The third mes-
sage from the chart, and the core finding, is that the
actual  losers  of  globalization  are  those  groups  that
can  still  be  labeled  as  the  “upper  middle  class”  –
though they are ranked no higher than the lower mid-
dle class in developed OECD countries. Their income
level has either stagnated or even shrunk in the last
three  decades.  They  hold  the  potential  for  populist
movements  and  parties,  without  necessarily  being
economically deprived. It would be possible to charac-
terize the experiences of this class as “a negative bal-
ance of  acknowledgment” (Endrikat  et  a.  2002)  and
apply the  broad concept  of  recognition  to it.  Apart
from economic factors,  the absence of interpersonal
recognition, the rejection of civic recognition and the
dismantling  of  so-called  “industrial  citizenship”  also
contribute  to  this  negative  balance  (Honneth  1992;
Brinkmann and Nachtwey 2017).
The wrath of this class is not directed against the
grotesquely  expanded  wealth  of  the  ultra-rich,  but
rather against immigrants, who are the most visible
expression of the rising internationalization and indi-
vidualization  of  market  society  –  one  which  is  no
longer able to offer people the same degree of purpose
and  security  that  the  national  welfare  state  once
could.  Their  wrath  is  also  directed  at  the  “liberal
elites” who have supposedly turned their backs on na-
tion and tradition and even seek to eliminate these
values.
Existing literature often draws a distinction between
economic and cultural explanations for new populist
movements. Inglehart and Norris (2016: 2), for exam-
ple,  differentiate between “economic insecurity” and
“cultural backlash” to account for the rising strength
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Image based on Milanovic (2012: 13).
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of populist right-wing parties. However, this is an er-
roneous depiction precisely because populism is  not
an economic class movement but rather an imagined
popular movement that claims to advocate the com-
mon good, while, in reality, only referring to a specific
group. This may, as an example, include the possibility
of  “being  and remaining  German”  and  maintaining
the “traditional family as a model”, just to cite the po-
litical  program promoted by the German AfD party
(Alternative for Germany) (AfD 2016: 6, 40).
Populism is more about appearance than content; it
is a versatile political style that can be used on the
right as well as on the left, one which must be filled
and made more tangible with additional content. In
Western  and  Eastern  Europe,  nationalism  usually
serves  as  a  filler  (though  not  in  left-wing  populist
Southern Europe). The nationalist variant of populism
sees itself as a protest of the “pure nation” against a
“corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004). Added to this is the con-
ception of a homogeneous populace, which today sees
itself  as  under  threat  from migration  and refugees.
Both of these coalesce within nationalistic populism,
which  blames  the  “liberal”  elites  for  the  ostensible
policies  of  open borders  and uncontrolled  immigra-
tion. As international comparative studies (see Kriesi
and Pappas  2015;  Mudde 2007)  have  demonstrated,
these are the two dominant issues on the agendas of
right-wing populist  parties in  Europe:  a rejection of
the European Union and a rejection of immigration.
When it comes to political polarization, political sci-
entists have been particularly interested in the polar-
izing effects that political party systems have on gov-
ernmental systems. Some political scientists consider
“cartel parties” (Mair 2015) to be the ideologically lev-
eling, increasingly pragmatic majority parties of the
neoliberal world order that have been absorbed by the
state apparatus and that have served as the reason for
the rise of populist parties. In response, parties such
as AfD, the Front National or Ukip have formed as a
radical alternative and polarization is often attributed
to their emergence (Bergfeld and Fischer 2017; Höver-
mann and Groß 2016).  The development of the AfD
from a relatively moderate right-wing populist party
(when compared to its counterparts across Europe) to
a party with strong tendency for right-wing extremist
views is instructive. A brief comparison of their plat-
forms in 2016 and 20175 shows a clear radicalization of
the party platform. The roots of this change are obvi-
ous: the international success of the populists in Great
Britain and the United States in 2016 clearly bolstered
the position of right-wing elements within AfD. But
this has also had to do with the endogenous polariza-
tion and radicalization of the political  discourse fol-
lowing the surprising breakthrough of Western pop-
ulism in the wake of the refugee movement in 2015 –
a historically exceptional event marked by what was
likely  the  greatest  thrust  of  international  migration
that any European country had experience over the
last 70 years. Considering the singularity of this event,
we may presume that further radicalization of the po-
litical party discourse will soon reach its limits. How
other parties will interact with AfD will depend on the
extent to which a growing openness towards repres-
sive, anti-pluralist and discriminatory structures and
actions solidifies. 
4.2 Migration, Islamophobia and shifts in the socio-
political discourse
The way in which migration is handled has not only
played  a  role  in  strengthening  populist  parties  and
populism, it has also been central to the issue of self-
image: the questions of “who are we?” and “who be-
longs?” This identity dimension is relevant at the level
of society, as it is here that the awareness of society
as a whole and the construction of the other, as well
as belonging, take shape. Polarization is incited when
the deepening threats of foreign infiltration, exclusion
and structural discrimination take root in the wake of
economic crises and trans-nationalization (Zick, Küp-
per, and Hövermann 2011; Heitmeyer 2012a).
Discursive constructions of identity that build on an
antagonistic, hostile relationship among social groups,
prone to polarizing a society, can be seen as a con-
tributing factor to the radicalization of the latter (see
Mason 2015; Suhay 2015). Studies on social cohesion
(see Rapp 2016) and on the role of social media em-
phasize  a  connection  among  identity  constructions
with social  media leading to a loss of the “common
public sphere” and, thus, to isolated, polarized and po-
tentially  hostile  groups,  in  extreme  cases  (Webster
2011; Holmes and McNeal 2016). Zarkov (2017: 199),
5 For an extended comparison see Herschinger et al. 2018.
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for instance, assumes that identity constructions fos-
ter negative opinions about social groups that are not
deemed to be members of majority society. This often
occurs when a discursive attribution of characteristics
establishes an inimical relationship between “us” and
“the others”. These sorts of defamatory strategies of
polarization, through which political rivals are turned
into  enemies,  are  typical  for  extremist  (right-wing)
parties and (right-wing) populist actors, and it is es-
sentially based on the proposition of the “inequality
of  social  groups”  (Küpper  and  Zick  2015;  Wodak
2015b). A hostile stance between the Others and one’s
own people can be made to resonate with society as a
whole  via  public  fearmongering  (Nagel  2016),  ulti-
mately leading to polarization.
The constructed borders of national identity can de-
velop into a radicalizing force when they forward the
idea of the inequality of the Others, as authors such
as Klein (2014: 224) have shown to be the case in Ger-
many (see also Heitmeyer 2012b: 15). This particularly
applies to Islamophobia, and the rejection of refugees
and Muslims,  which, according to countless studies,
has been on the rise. Using the example of Germany,
Zick, Küpper and Krause (2016;  also Zick 2016: 207)
demonstrate that the hostility towards Muslims and
immigrants  harbored  by  right-wing  populist  and
right-wing extremist groups has found resonance at
the center of society. Moreover, as 40% of respondents
believe that German “society has been infiltrated by
Islam”, Islamophobia has itself turned into “a conspir-
acy myth” (Zick 2016: 207). Decker, Kiess and Brähler
(2016) also highlight this point by showing that Islam-
ophobia  is  most  strongly  articulated  among  anti-
democratic authoritarian milieus. Some scholars have
even begun to speak of a normalization of Islamopho-
bia within the public discourse, which has been pro-
moted, not least, by the Pegida movement (Bergfeld
and Fischer 2017: 19; Mondon and Winter 2017). 
Discourse-analytical  studies  have  investigated  this
development among political  and medial  discourses,
public opinion, the visible positions taken by various
social groups in relation to one another within it, the
negotiation of social conflicts and the resultant shift
in norms. These studies highlight how discursive pro-
cesses of normalization lead to the “normalization of
the not-normal” (such as immigrants posing a threat)
and to a concurrent shift in the borders of what can
be said (through fake news and fake science as well as
through attacks against democratic institutions such
as the judiciary and the media, reminiscent of the “ly-
ing press”) (Wodak 2018: 324; Jäger and Jäger 2007). 
These studies have generally not investigated such
processes  of  normalization  in  view of  radicalization
but rather in relation to the construction of immigra-
tion in the public discourse, right-wing populist dis-
courses (Wodak 2015b, 2015a; Link 2018)  or national
defense  against  terrorism.  Studies  on  terrorism,  for
example,  often  address  the  matter  of  how polariza-
tions are created by way of discursive formulations of
a (new) consensus – the “war on terror” – or the (al-
tered) constructions of identity (such as the “Axis of
Evil”),  thereby  promoting  radicalization.  Discourse-
analytical studies on the topic of immigration and in-
tegration illustrate that the definition of “who belongs
to ‘us’ and who does not; what is of benefit  to ‘us’
and what is not; what one must fear and what one
must not; who is at fault; etc.” (Wodak 2015a: 32) leads
groups  within  society  to  adopt  a  hostile  stance  to-
wards each other. These types of polarizations do not
arise overnight: they often exhibit a historical conti-
nuity  and  foster  the  normalization  of  certain  posi-
tions, shift the borders of what can be said and foster
hostile polarizations (Mondon and Winter 2017; Cam-
maerts 2018).
Though the consequences of such politically polar-
ized situations  can vary,  they are also far  reaching.
For instance, they have the potential to empower po-
litical  and  social  action  when  broad  restrictions  on
civil liberties are enacted for the purposes of protect-
ing the nation against terrorism, thereby altering the
relationship  between  state  and  citizen  (see  Jackson
2005; Herschinger 2011). The same is true for cases in
which social realities and norms are changed, despite
opposition, such as the liberalization of marriage for
same-sex partners or entitlements to citizenship. The
contested nature of diversity in the public discourse is
instructive here. This debate reveals the necessity for
social diversity in a pluralist, democratic society and
the  anti-pluralist  movements  that  advocate  for  an
“end to tolerance”, which can have the effect of inten-
sifying polarization.
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4.3 Re-nationalization/re-ethnicizing
Another  factor  contributing  to  the  radicalization  of
society  is  the  phenomenon  of  re-nationalization/re-
ethnicizing,  i.e.,  the  spread  of  right-wing  extremist
views among individuals of foreign ancestry in West-
ern Europe (e.g., the Turkish nationalist group “Grey
Wolves” or the perpetrator of the 2016 Munich shoot-
ing, a German-Iranian). In Germany, this sort of eth-
nicization of social conflicts goes hand in hand with
the escalation of social confrontations and processes
of social pluralization. Ethno-cultural group identities,
in particular, are stimulated in order to gain an advan-
tage in the struggle for social and economic distribu-
tion. This ethnicization emerges as a “mechanism for
social exclusion” that “negatively labels” immigrants
and perpetuates the privileges of a dominant majority
(Butterwegge 2006: 186). A growing process of re-eth-
nicization and re-nationalization may result in a radi-
calization processes related to one’s place of origin as
well as a response to the fault lines and exclusionary
mechanisms of  the host society.  Research on immi-
gration has  shown that there is  a  mounting racism
among migrants, drawing support from nationalistic
claims  to  superiority  and  the  devaluation  of  other
groups and minorities (Bozay 2017b: 57).
As  argued in  research  on  radicalization,  trans-na-
tionalization is taken to be an essential element of re-
ethnicization/re-nationalization.  Domestic  political
conflicts raging in the respective countries of origin of
immigrant  groups become manifest  in  the receiving
country. Studies show that views held by young Mus-
lims about Britain’s foreign policies are closely related
to social, economic and cultural sources of dissatisfac-
tion (O’Duffy 2008) and that debates surrounding the
conflict in the Middle East, policies towards the Kur-
dish population and relations between Turkey and Eu-
rope have an impact on (young) Germans of foreign
ancestry. The more that domestic political conflicts in
these countries of origin escalate, the greater the like-
lihood that fault lines will develop within the society
of  immigrants,  some of  which  may  lead  to  violent
confrontations (Bozay 2017a; Jikell 2017). 
These conflicts show the degree to which social and
national problems are ethnicized and how the activi-
ties of right-wing extremist individuals of foreign an-
cestry  relate  to  their  country  of  origin  (see  Ortner
2010; Bozay 2017a, 2017b). On the other hand, this dy-
namic of self-ethnicization and self-exclusion can also
be  explained by  the  (perceived)  right-wing  populist
and  anti-Muslim  atmosphere  prevalent  within  the
host society. Here, we are dealing with the social “im-
portation” of ethnic conflicts from the country of ori-
gin to the host country (see Brieden 1996: 17-19). One
result of this is the flourishing of large numbers ultra-
nationalistic umbrella organizations with a high po-
tential for mobilization. Ultimately, the polarizations
among various groups and social layers that arise as a
result of this also might lead to a radicalization of so-
ciety.
4.4 Anti-Semitism
One commonality  shared  by  all  three  forms  of  ex-
tremism considered above is their fundamental anti-
Semitic stance.  Looking at the context  of  Germany,
studies  on  right-wing  extremism  include  anti-
Semitism  within  the  right-wing  extremist  scale.  In
terms of left-wing extremism and Islamism, the posi-
tions taken with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict are
telling. Among the former group, this varies depend-
ing on which current of the left-wing spectrum one
considers: anti-imperialists reject the existence of Is-
rael and criticize Israeli foreign policy as being racist
(Ullrich 2015) while the leftist so-called anti-Germans
are seen as a “supportive of Israel” with an uncondi-
tional position in support of the state of Israel and Ju-
daism (Kestler 2007: 52). Within Islamism, the conflict
serves to construct a collective concept of the enemy,
“Israel”, as well as a new Muslim collective identity.
The concept of the enemy creates “community and a
sense of belonging” (Müller 2012: 65) centered around
the rejection of Israel and the concurrent glorification
of one’s own Muslim group. A study by Mansel and
Spaiser (2013) references society as a whole, address-
ing the racist, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic views
held by young people (of and without foreign ances-
try) in Germany. In a measure of “Israel-related anti-
Semitism”, 41.5% of Arab young people agree with the
statement that “Jewish people are less likable due to
Israel’s policies”, compared to only 2.9% of young peo-
ple  who  are  not  of  foreign  ancestry  (Mansel  and
Spaiser 2013: 193).
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One  possible  factor  contributing  to  anti-Semitic
views, especially among people of Arab and Turkish
ancestry, relates to the political and radical interpreta-
tion  of  Islam.  Islamist  movements  propagate  anti-
Semitic  conspiracy  theories  and call  for  a  “struggle
against the Jews” (Müller 2012: 58). Here, Kiefer (2007:
72) refers to “Islamist anti-Semitism”, citing that anti-
Semitism in the Arab world is  primarily an “import
from  Europe”.  The  issue  of  anti-Semitic  sentiments
among refugees is also currently being debated. One
recent study found “a broad range of views towards
Jewish  people”  to  exist  (Jikell  2017:  8).  Mansel  and
Spaiser (2013: 75) claim that experiences of discrimi-
nation and exclusion are interwoven with anti-Semitic
views,  especially considering that young people suf-
fering from such experiences tend to be more suscep-
tible to anti-Semitism.
5 Conclusion
We may conclude by affirming that the research dis-
cussed thus far  highlights that political  polarization
constitutes a threat to open society by promoting its
very radicalization. Significant socio-political changes
such as growth in extremist views among the middle
of society, the rise of populist parties and an increase
in populism, a problematic approach to immigration,
Islamophobia,  anti-Semitism and  exclusionary  iden-
tity  constructions are all  polarizing factors.  This  re-
sults in a reduction of social cohesion as polarization
leads to hostile confrontations between extremist in-
dividuals, groups, milieus and social layers as well as
between the proponents of non-radicalized positions.
Such confrontation can lead to a calcification of posi-
tions,  be  they political  or  religious.  The radicalizing
effect  primarily  arises  from  the  fact  that  calcified
views do more than just turn their backs on the pre-
dominant norms, they also effect a shift towards less
openness, diversity and plurality within society. This
is  likewise supported by an increased willingness to
employ violence – which does not necessarily refer to
terrorist acts but, rather, and in particular, the consis-
tently high number of attacks targeting refugees men-
tioned above. The root of the radicalization of society
as a whole by individuals and groups lies in the very
questioning of the legitimacy of the prevailing order.
We have offered a conceptualization of the radical-
ization of society emerging from radicalizing individu-
als or groups, who polarize society and create a cli-
mate  conducive  to  radicalization.  While  we  have
shown that  societal  radicalization  is  a  multifaceted
process, the various factors considered here all share
the capacity to polarize society. By identifying polar-
ization as a main promoter of radicalization – deemed
to “increase the propensity of all participants in inter-
action to employ violent means” (Tilly 2003: 229) – we
have gained a solid  perspective for  further research
into the radicalization of society.
What  is  needed now is  thorough comparative  re-
search on radicalization that is able to draw consoli-
dated conclusions about the relationship between rad-
icalization  phenomena  and  changes  within  society.
While it is not easy to draw conclusions at the level of
entire societies (hence our illustrative focus on Ger-
many), some factors presented here might be instruc-
tive for comparative research. Based on factors such
as anti-Semitism – which is not only a component of
extremist ideologies but also a common thread that
runs throughout society – comparative views can pro-
vide us with insights into how exactly anti-Semitism
manifests  today,  the  potential  for  mobilization  it
holds and how it can be counteracted.
A comparative  perspective would also allow us to
conduct a thorough analysis of the role of the state as
a  political  representative  of  society.  To what  extent
can government measures  have a  radicalizing effect
on (segments of) society? We should not overlook the
instance of co-radicalization by the state as a catalyst
for radicalization potential. This point is currently be-
ing addressed by international radicalization research
on Islamist currents and it may be expanded to other
forms of extremism.
Furthermore, comparative approaches stand to ben-
efit from the idea of conceptualizing society in terms
of communication or discourse, as important sociolog-
ical studies have done in the past. By applying such
an  understanding  of  society,  this  perspective  could
approach the potential for radicalization in society as
a whole that arises out of the dynamics between the
structural and the individual or group-specific level by
looking more deeply into the ways in which they in-
teract (see Pisoiu 2013: 55-57). At the same time, po-
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larization as a catalyst for societal radicalization could
be built  upon using these different  perspectives,  al-
lowing for a more nuanced conceptualization of how
the radicalization of individuals and groups affects so-
ciety as a whole and potentially leads to mass radical-
ization.
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